UN-WELCOME MAT
by John O'Sullivan
New York Post
February 27, 2005

It is hard to overstate the significance of this speech. Until a few years ago, Washington saw Germany as the "swing" country in Europe. The Brits were reliably pro-American and Atlanticist; the French were reliably opposed; as long as the Germans remained on the Atlanticist side, all would be well with the alliance. Now the German chancellor was serving notice that Berlin had switched firmly to the French side and wanted the E.U. to be a "counterweight" to U.S. power.

(No one took comfort from the offical assurances that Schroeder was merely thinking aloud. Heads of government do not think aloud unless they want their thoughts to signal a new direction in policy.)

So President Bush used speeches and media interviews to signal his polite disagreement with the German chancellor and, by extension, with the Franco-German axis. He explicitly rejected Schroeder's claim that NATO was declining in importance, saying it remained "vital." He opposed the idea that Europe should develop its own European defense organization separate from NATO. He attacked the Franco-German dogma that the E.U. should become a "counterweight" to American power. And he stressed that the West could achieve almost anything in world politics provided it remained united.

So a clear gulf in policy existed between President Bush and his French and German counterparts as he spoke in Brussels on Monday.

Only in the most exceptional cases, however, do summits and presidential trips end in public failure. They are arranged in advance down to the smallest detail by advance committees of so-called "sherpas" to ensure success.

So each side made modest concessions. NATO's European members agreed to send military and police training missions to Iraq. Bush reiterated several times that he had no plans to invade Iran. There were expressions of high regard all round. The media reported an improvement in relations.

BUT the underlying dispute over the shape of the Atlantic alliance re mained even if was masked in the politely coded language of Bush, Chirac, Scroeder and the rest.

America supports the traditional model: an alliance in which the United States is the clear leader of middling and smaller powers acting together in world politics. France and Germany, on the other hand, want the European Union to develop into a single superpower with its own foreign policy and armed forces.

Such an "equal partner" would inevitably develop as a rival to America in world politics. And the West would gradually separate into two powers — both superpowers but neither enjoying the overwhelming dominance of today's West.

Until very recently, the United States has largely ignored this threat. How could an EU that spent an average of only 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense be a rival? But Europe was never going to invade America. It could nonetheless damage U.S. interests in lesser but still serious ways. Two examples:

* A French "Green" politician, Noel Mamere, led a recent news broadcast with this statement: "The good thing about the European Constitution is that with it the United Kingdom will not be able to support the United States in a future war."

* The new head of the European Defense Agency, Nick Witney, who is responsible for co-ordinating European defense procurement, said: "In matters of technology, I think Europe is engaged in competition with America."

In other words, a European Union formed on Franco-German lines would prevent America's closest allies in Europe from cooperating with the United States in major crises and redirect defense spending away from joint Euro-American projects towards wholly "European" ones. And, of course, it could cooperate with rising powers like China in trade, diplomacy, arms supplies and votes at the U.N. Security Council.

Indeed, the E.U. is about to ignore American protests and start re-supplying China with advanced weapons — weapons which, as Washington points out, might one day be used against U.S. troops defending Taiwan. And the more independent of the United States the new Europe becomes, the more it is likely to ignore American protests.

INSOFAR as America foresaw such threats in the past, it relied on the Ger mans and the British inside the E.U. to ensure that they never amounted to much. But the Germans have now defected to Paris — and not just the Germans.

Tony Blair is generally seen in world politics as the personal friend and political ally of President Bush. On a range of issues such as the development of a European defense force, however, the Brits under Blair have quietly moved away from America toward the Franco-German position.

Blair keeps saying he does not want to choose between Europe and America. But when Paris and Berlin force him to do so, he always chooses Europe — with the single exception of Iraq.

That will continue as long as the Franco-German vision of Europe is the dominant one — or indeed the only one available. And that will only change if the United States throws its full diplomatic weight behind a different model of Europe and the Atlantic alliance.

One can sum up that choice very simply: either the E.U. develops a defense dimension, or NATO develops a trade and economics dimension. If the former, then Europe and America will eventually go their separate ways. If the latter, then the Euro-Atlantic community will become the next major player in world politics.

AT the moment, a separate Europe looks the better bet. But there were signs in the president's speeches — with their heartfelt and almost desperat emphasis on keeping NATO as the main Atlantic institution — that he realizes what is at stake.

If he decides to fight for a united West under U.S. leadership, however, then he will have the Mother of All Battles on his hands. And there will quickly be an end to smiles.

John O'Sullivan, a former Post Editorial-Page Editor, is now editor of "The National Interest" and a member of Benador Associates.