The government of Pervez Musharraf appears to have sanctioned the re-emergence of the Taliban, write James Jones and Mansoor Ijaz.
By JAMES JONES & MANSOOR IJAZ
James Jones was Nato Supreme Allied Commander from 2003-2007. Mansoor Ijaz, an American of Pakistani ancestry, jointly authored the blueprint for the ceasefire in Kashmir between Mujahedeen fighters and Indian security forces in 2000.
Pakistan and Afghanistan stand at a dangerous crossroads in their complex and troubled relationship. Both strong allies of the US in its war to eradicate terrorism, Afghanistan is labouring to find stability under Nato mandate while Pakistan is struggling to find a balance between national interest and regional responsibilities to fight extremists on its own soil. Sadly, Afghanistan is losing its struggle for stability and security in part because Pakistan cannot decide whether it wants to fight terrorism or encourage it as state policy.
The government of Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, appears to have quietly sanctioned the re-emergence of the Taliban in stoking Afghanistan's instability. Evidence of Pakistan's complicity has been presented to Mr Musharraf by both US and Nato commanders. The Musharraf government has been unhelpful in addressing the problems of porous borders. Proposals to fence and mine segments of the Afghan border have not been implemented.
Why does Pakistan play this game? In the pre-9/11 world, Afghanistan was considered part of Pakistan's "strategic depth" in military planning terms – a land where Pakistani forces could retreat if neighbouring India encroached with its larger conventional forces so the Pakistani army could live to fight another day. In the post-9/11 world, modern, technology-savvy India began pouring tens of millions of investment dollars into Afghanistan's battered economy when the Taliban were expelled, aiming to raise up its disaffected people. That may have conflicted with the national objectives of Pakistan's military intelligence strategists.
India's economist-prime minister, Manmohan Singh, has long understood that the only way to eradicate extremism from south Asia is to gainfully employ people and give them a stake in the development of their homelands and families. India's blemish was a brutal occupation of Kashmir, where Pakistan's intelligence services have long plotted to keep the Indian army at bay by fuelling militant Muslim insurgencies. They funded this chaos with Middle East petrodollars and Afghanistan's forlorn human capital. Pakistan's army and intelligence apparatus have benefited immensely, meanwhile, from the big business of war. Now, any other way of life is unacceptable.
Pakistan's policies regarding Afghanistan are crucial to the future stability of the entire region. Mr Musharraf would do well to propose a regional summit with Mr Karzai, who should accept his offer. Mr Singh, key military and intelligence advisers and top economists should be at the table in support of reconciliation. Nato commanders and senior Nato civilians in the region should be included as observers to ensure transparency and objectivity of the intelligence data and operational information that will have to be shared and evaluated. Such a conference would send a strong message about the futility of struggle to those who oppose the international effort to bring security and stability to the region.
The summit should aim to achieve some or all of the following objectives:
- India must start by dispelling the myth that it is using investment in Afghanistan to creep up on Pakistan's western borders. It should widen its partnership with Pakistan in the same areas of trade in which it is now helping Afghanistan, if not others that strengthen the bilateral and even trilateral regional partnership. Pakistani and Indian intelligence officials should agree the parameters for making this happen on a secure basis. Business should enact these agreements under such guidelines as to avoid mistrust.
- A regional intelligence centre was recently created to improve intelligence sharing. It should be beefed up so that data can be shared between countries on a transparent and factual basis using Nato's Tripartite Council as the venue to build trust among the parties. India has proved its part of the equation by assisting Pakistani intelligence to thwart assassination attempts on Mr Musharraf. Only mistrust of motives prevents this policy from being put in place. Nato could play a key role in the early stages of such a joint intelligence-sharing venture to depoliticise the use of intelligence in border patrolling, narcotics control and arms trafficking.
- Mr Karzai and Mr Musharraf need to end their blood feud and adopt more statesmen-like behaviour towards each other. They must acknowledge their own mistakes – Mr Musharraf for not reining in Taliban remnants on his soil and Mr Karzai for not meeting the expectations of the Afghan people, who voted overwhelmingly for a better and freer life about two years ago.
Afghanistan cannot continue to drift towards becoming a narco-state that provides financial support to insurgents. Pakistan must reset its priorities in the global struggle against extremism. Lip service to evidence of wrongdoing and stubbornness born of fragile egos will not bring solutions. Mr Musharraf must build trust with his counterparts in New Delhi and Kabul to address regional grievances and give renewed hope to south Asia's embattled citizens.
© Copyright, The Financial Times Ltd. 2007, All Rights Reserved.
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