| Even according to the logic of Prime Minister Sharon, who trampled upon rules of orderly government on his way to achieve his goal, while leftists and intellectuals, who would normally raise hell under such circumstances kept silent this time, an unresolved contradiction remains, which will only postpone the crisis to a few months hence, when the concrete question of removing Israeli settlements from Gaza comes up for a cabinet vote.
The prime minister was forced into accepting a gradual process of evacuation of Gaza as part of his amended plan, leaving open exit escapes in case something goes wrong, for example if the Palestinians evince more violence than they are expected, or circumstances change to such an extent that the Israeli government feels no longer obliged to abide by the disengagement plan.
However, neither the prime minister and his supporters, nor his opponents who have reluctantly compromised with his amended plan once the principle of graduation had been incorporated into it, seem to be aware of the double contradiction built into it and likely to undermine it. For if disengagement is unilateral, for the good reason that the prime minister believes that he has no partners among the Palestinians, then why is graduation needed in the first place? For if they misbehave, this should be a good reason, if anything, to speed up the process of disengagement from them, not to slow it down, which was started precisely because of their misconduct. And those in Israel who support disengagement and would even join Sharon's government in order to accelerate it, don't they care whether it is carried out partly or in full? Aren't they concerned that we may have here a replay of Lebanon 2000, when the unilateral Israeli withdrawal was construed by the Arabs as a capitulation by Israel, and far from toning down their attacks against her, they on the contrary triggered the current Intifadah?
And another problem: when the Palestinians are announcing that they are set to take responsibility over any territory relinquished by Israel, don't we forfeit the graduation of the plan? Moreover, they are already declaring, with Egyptian and American backing, that they regard this disengagement as only the first step towards the total withdrawal of Israel from the entire West Bank too, so as to facilitate, in Powell's words, a "contiguous" state on the entire territory, with an overland bridge to Gaza, which would in the future menace to isolate the northern part of Israel from its south. The Egyptians, who became recently involved in this endeavor are already demanding that the Israeli withdrawal encompass the Philadephi Axis which marks the boundary between them and Gaza, as well as Gaza's airspace and maritime waters. These are totally unacceptable objectives to Israel, who continues to state, nevertheless, that Egypt has changed its attitude to Israel and has decided to collaborate strategically with the Disengagement plan.
But the worst facet of this perverse exercise is that while Sharon has accepted to withdraw from Gaza in order to preserve Israel's interests in the West Bank in the long run, all his open and tacit "supporters" are not of the same view. In other words, while they wish to gnaw at Israel's stand and cause it to withdraw, he envisions the moment when he would cease ceding territory and begin insisting on the remuneration he thought he bargained for. But precisely then he would be exposed to more pressures, domestically and externally, to pursue more withdrawals without any reciprocation from the Palestinians and without any permanent settlement, exactly as had happened to Barak in Lebanon. Sharon did not demand nor expect his supporters of the Labor Party, and certainly not the Egyptians and the Jordanians who are also prodding him to retreat, to accept the restrictions he wishes to impose on the closed-up Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. All they care is to continue to press him to withdraw, for if Israel has "nothing to do in Gaza," they have nothing to do in Balata (in the Nblus) or Yatta (the Hebron area) either.
Before Sharon announced his disengagement plan, and even before he raised the issue in his cabinet, he visited President Bush and made sure to get far-reaching American pledges, that were the long-term remuneration he was seeking in return for his immediate disengagement in Gaza. Bush recognized the new reality on the ground, namely he approved the prospects of Israel keeping chunks of West Bank territory in the permanent settlement. That is not entirely without precedent, if one takes into account the 242 Resolution and the Rogers Plan, where territorial adjustments were given positive consideration. But this was the first-ever presidential statement that America stood in favor of Israel's ultimate annexation of large swaths of Palestinian territory. No less important is the American acknowledgment of the death of the Palestinian Right of Return, something that had risen so high in the Palestinian agenda that it sufficed to scuttle the Camp David and Taba conferences of 2000. Equipped with those two major promises, Sharon was confident he could sell his plan to an incredulous Israeli public, due to the future rosy pledges, even if the concessions at hand felt excruciatingly painful.
Did Sharon check with his coalition partners or his prospective supporters in Labor, not to speak of the Palestinians, the Egyptians and Jordanians, whether they shared the same vision, at the same time that they viewed disengagement as the first step of withdrawal from all territories? Does Sharon realize, before he boasts of the "assistance" Mubarak can lend to him in implementing his plan, that the Egyptian president would accept neither to give up full Israeli withdrawal not renounce the Right of Return of Palestinians? Even had he consented, would he be able to pursue that policy in a turbulent Arab world that is eager to see Israel (and America) chastised rather than rewarded? Mubarak's action to calm the moods in Gaza does not stem from a sudden turn of sympathy to Sharon or to Israel, but from American pressure that he justify the large American aid invested in him by harnessing himself to the disengagement plan that America has committed itself to. Most of all, Mubarak, like the rest of Arab leaders in Palestine, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia would move against their Islamists only when these menace their rule, not as long as they "merely" endanger Israel. He is rightly concerned that if he does not take command of events in neighboring Gaza, the Hamas there might fill the chaotic vacuum and take over, something that may be echoed by the Egyptian fundamentalists who have for long posed a threat to him.
For all these intricate reasons, the disengagement plan does not hold much water. In Israel the left who supports Sharon also clamors for leaving Gaza immediately and resuming talks with the Palestinians. If disengagement is effected unilaterally, then there is no need for negotiations; what do they want to negotiate about if the bottom line is already known? More withdrawals could also be done without negotiation, if this is their objective. And whom do they want to negotiate with if there is unilateral disengagement? All the actual and prospective supporters of the plan must be asked whether they share Sharon's vision in the post-disengagement period, which was the very rationale of the deal. If they do, then they will stand with him in a united front when more demands for more withdrawals would be tabled. But if they do not share that vision, as is the case with the Labor Party and certainly the Arabs, then what is the meaning of this exercise in futility, when Sharon is likely to see his partners in disengagements confront him in the future and accusing him, as they did to Netanyahu, that he sabotaged the settlement with the Palestinians?
About the author: Raphael Israeli, the author of eighteen books on the Middle East, Islam, and Sino-Islamic relations, is Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies as well as Chinese History, at Hebrew University. He is represented exclusively by Eleana Benador of Benador and Associates. Raphael can be reached by e-mail at www.benadorassociates.com. |
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