THIS IS SADDAM'S TERROR MACHINE, NOT ARMED RESISTANCE
by Amir Taheri
THE TIMES OF LONDON
December 2, 2003

Whatever it is called, the wave of violence that has hit Iraq since the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in May has claimed some 1,500 lives, including those of more than 200 American and British soldiers. And last weekend's battles in Samarra show that the armed groups, though suffering high casualties, intend to keep the pressure on the coalition.

These terror attacks are not political. Their instigators — the Fedayin, guerrilla fighters loyal to Saddam's old regime — do not present any political demands. The choice of targets shows that there is no coherent political strategy behind the attacks. To be sure, pundits speculate about such motives, but if the aim is to drive Americans out, why do these terrorists attack Muslim embassies, the UN, the Red Cross, hospitals, universities, and other places where Iraqi civilians congregate?

Neither are the Saddamists' activities a serious political challenge. They have little popular support; rather, the coalition enjoys backing from a majority of Iraqis on two points: making sure that the fallen Baathist regime does not return in any form, and preventing a single ethnic or religious group from winning an exclusive hold on power.

No, the agenda behind these acts is not political, so the violence cannot be dealt with by political means — changing policies or alliances, seeking dialogue or compromises.

Similarly, the attacks cannot be understood in military terms. The instigators are not trying to capture territory or deny territory to the coalition. Neither are they seeking to destroy the coalition's major assets, disrupt their logistics or seize control of vital resources. Flooding Iraq with boots, to the tune of half a million or more, will not be an effective way to deal with the violence.

General John Abizaid, head of US Central Command, overstated the case when he suggested that Iraq was witnessing a guerrilla war. Rather than fish swimming in a sea of popular support, a prerequisite for effective guerrilla war, those responsible for the terrorist operations in Iraq are sharks in an aquarium known as the Sunni Triangle. Although the terrorists have been able to exploit the resentment of some Sunni groups, it would be wrong to see that community as an enemy of the coalition. (Sunni grievances, including the fear of not getting a fair share in a future government, should be addressed on their own merit).

What we are witnessing is terrorism — and strong policing is the only way to combat it. The coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council had much success in dealing with the explosion of ordinary crimes and lawlessness which Baghdad suffered in the immediate aftermath of liberation. That success was achieved through the organisation of Iraqi police units and by setting up neighbourhood watch networks that supply the information needed for crime prevention and detection. What the coalition needs — and has failed to establish — is a counter-terrorism force that can hunt down the remaining Fedayin and the criminal gangs that work with them. This is not a task for the conventional war machine which the coalition has assembled.

Though the fallen despot may not be personally in charge, the attacks bear the hallmark of Saddam's leadership. As always, he has embarked on a course that looks tactically promising but is bound to be ruinous for him at the long-term strategic level. The coalition has no choice but to persevere until what is left of Saddam's terror machine is broken.

The author is an Iranian commentator on Middle Eastern affairs